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WILFRED BURCHETT & THE UN COMMAND’S MEDIA RELATIONS 
DURING THE KOREAN WAR, 1951-1952 
 
 
 
Few Cold War correspondents were more controversial than Wilfred 
Burchett. To the left he was a radical truth-hunter, roving around 
Asia and uncovering the big stories largely because he was 
unencumbered by the corporate, ideological, and governmental 
constraints that made so many Western reporters silent about the 
errors, even crimes, of their own side. To the right, however, he 
was nothing more than a communist traitor, beholden to the 
unsavory Chinese and Vietnamese communist regimes whose false 
propaganda he tried to disseminate to a global audience. In a 
journalistic career spanning more than three decades, Burchett 
gave both his supporters and detractors ample ammunition to fight 
their battles, from his eyewitness scoop of the Hiroshima 
destruction to his close contacts with men like Zhou Enlai and Ho 
Chi Minh. But no period of Burchett’s contentious career was more 
controversial than the two-and-a-half years he spent in Korea 
covering the protracted armistice talks to end the war. 
Burchett arrived in Korea on a hot summer’s day in July 
1951, planning to spend just a few weeks covering the negotiations 
for the left-wing Parisian newspaper Ce Soir. But as the talks 
dragged on, he stayed, his presence spawning two controversies 
that festered for decades. In 1952, he was at the forefront of the 
communist propaganda campaign that accused the United States of 
using germ warfare against North Korean and Chinese troops, 
interviewing soldiers who had seen “a long brown stream emerging 
from an American plane” and adding praise for the efficiency of 
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Chinese medicine, which, he claimed, had prevented the outbreak of 
a lethal epidemic. Later, he was attacked by right-wing critics, 
who accused him of taking part in the interrogation — and even the 
brainwashing — of United Nations (UN) prisoners of war languishing 
in communist camps, allegations that helped to convince the 
Australian government to deny him a passport, a decision that 
heated up the debate about Burchett’s Cold War record still 
further.1
Even now, more than twenty-five years after his death, 
Burchett remains a figure of intense interest, with fierce 
partisans on either side continuing to publish articles, 
anthologies, and biographies, many of them rehashing all the old 
arguments.2 Nonetheless, the passage of time has given a little 
more perspective to these two eye-catching Korean controversies. 
Indeed, while many Cold War historians now tend to dismiss or 
downplay the germ warfare allegations that Burchett helped to 
disseminate, especially since the available Soviet records seem to 
suggest that they were indeed little more than Cold War 
propaganda,3 the charge that Burchett engaged in interrogating or 
brainwashing UN POWs has been effectively demolished by the 
declassification of affidavits signed by the prisoners themselves, 
which tend to confirm that his activity was far from sinister.4
In one area, however, Burchett’s Korean War record still 
casts a long lingering shadow. This is his argument of double-
dealing, distortion, and even lying by the U.S. military, which, 
he charged, were the dominant themes of military-media relations 
during the protracted armistice negotiations at Kaesong and then 
Panmunjom, especially in 1951 and 1952. 
In his memoir, Again Korea, Burchett savagely denounced the 
U.S. military’s information policy during this final phase of the 
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Korean War. He charged, first, that during the summer of 1951 
Admiral C. Turner Joy and the United Nations Command’s (UNC) 
negotiating team lied to reporters about their bargaining position 
on the truce line. According to Burchett, not only did they 
completely suppress the fact that the United States demanded an 
end to the war well above the current battle front but they also 
claimed — in “one of the great hoaxes of history” — that it was 
the Chinese and North Koreans, not the Americans, who were holding 
up progress in the talks by refusing to discuss a truce line along 
the thirty-eighth parallel. By the autumn, when western reporters 
finally got wind of their negotiators’ perfidy, Burchett claimed 
that Joy’s “badly shaken” public-relations setup revamped its 
press policy. But rather than providing more information, Burchett 
alleged that its aim was to obfuscate still further, issuing even 
more distorted briefings to friendly reporters, while trying to 
intimidate those correspondents who refused to accept the lies. In 
Burchett’s account, however, many correspondents would not be 
bullied. And, recognizing that the communist-based reporters were 
more reliable than their own military, the UN-accredited 
correspondents not only fraternized with them but also based their 
stories on communist, rather than American, sources.5
 These are highly damaging allegations. They also remain 
significant because they form the bedrock for the small but 
extremely influential literature on the subject. This article 
critically examines them. It begins by exploring how and why 
Burchett’s account has exerted such an influence over the 
literature, especially given the enormous controversy his name 
excites. It then looks closely at the primary record, much of it 
untapped, in an effort to provide a more solid account of the 
UNC’s media record during this important period of the Korean War. 
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I. 
Wilfred Burchett was not an impartial observer. During the 1940s, 
he worked as a Daily Express correspondent, covering the Sino-
Japanese War, the Burma campaign, and the Pacific island-hopping 
operations for this staunchly conservative and pro-imperial 
British newspaper. But he had long been a political radical. And 
his wartime experiences pushed him further leftwards, for in India 
he was irritated by what he saw as the unwarranted superiority of 
British officers who presided over an ailing and racist empire; in 
China he was attracted by the calm dignity and forceful 
intelligence of Chinese communist leaders like Zhou Enlai; and in 
Japan he was appalled by the terrible destructiveness of American 
firepower, which reached its culmination at Hiroshima, a story 
Burchett covered to enormous acclaim when he provided the first 
eyewitness account of conditions on the ground just weeks after 
the bomb was dropped. 
Assigned to Europe during the late 1940s, Burchett 
eventually found his professional and political loyalties tugging 
in different directions. During the war, while Britain and the 
United States were fighting fascism alongside the Soviet Union, he 
had not worried too much about the politics of the Lord 
Beaverbrook-owned Daily Express. Increasingly, however, he saw his 
principal task as chronicling the great strides in global progress 
being undertaken by the new communist regimes, and this was a 
story that the tabloid, anti-communist Express had less and less 
interest in covering. Setting out on his own, Burchett returned to 
Australia in the summer of 1950 for a four-month lecture tour, in 
which he regaled audiences with America’s use of atomic diplomacy, 
not to mention the West’s harboring of Nazi war criminals. He also 
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made it perfectly clear that he thought the Americans were 
responsible for the start of the Cold War, while insisting that 
the Soviets had no aggressive intentions and had made no warlike 
preparations.6
Arriving in China in early 1951 to write a book on Mao 
Zedong’s budding revolution, Burchett immediately found a more 
congenial environment. Hailed as an “honored foreign guest 
writer,” he considered the new China a great hope for the causes 
of progressivism and world peace.7 Of course, like any writer 
based in Mao’s China, Burchett was scarcely a free agent. In fact, 
he was heavily indebted to the communist authorities for his most 
basic professional needs. “I am treated on the same basis as a 
local writer,” he revealingly wrote home in April 1951, 
 
although you need not spread this news outside our own 
circle. In other words I am relieved of financial cares and 
given facilities to see what I want to see, travel where I 
want to travel, interview who I want to interview.... I 
would do anything at all for this people and their 
government because they represent the fullest flowering of 
all the finest instincts in humanity.8  
 
As this last comment suggests, whatever his dependence on the 
communist government, Burchett was clearly a true believer in the 
communist cause. Privately, he was convinced that communism would 
triumph after two more five year plans. In the meantime, he had no 
doubt that China was winning the war in Korea, and believed that 
nothing the Americans could do, not even “super techniques as 
[the] pouring in of more cannon-fodder,” would “alter the 
situation.” He even gave credence to “miracle” procedures being 
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tested by Chinese doctors, such as “tissue treatment,” which saved 
lives, healed long-term ailments, and cured “virtually all 
sicknesses dealing with the nervous or digestive system.” In 
public, he amplified these views. Indeed, after traveling from 
Beijing to North Korea in July 1951, he became one of China’s most 
visible polemicists, using his regular Ce Soir dispatches to 
attack American aggression and push the current communist 
propaganda line.9
 After the Korean War, Burchett remained a trenchant 
partisan, spending many years in South East Asia, where he became 
a major advocate for the North Vietnamese cause. When he published 
Again Korea in 1968, he had an obvious political purpose related 
to this major new Cold War conflict in Asia. Indeed, Burchett 
thought a negotiated settlement was the most likely outcome in 
Vietnam. He therefore wanted to put down a new propaganda marker. 
No one, his book suggested, should trust anything that emanated 
from the U.S. military, especially when it was engaged in complex 
negotiations to end a protracted war in Asia.10
Because Burchett was such a blatant partisan, it seems 
surprising that his account has held such a sway over the 
literature of the Korean period. But on close inspection, the 
reasons are not difficult to fathom. Burchett was one of the few 
correspondents with direct Korean experience who published a 
memoir on the armistice period. Indeed, although a number of 
American and British reporters wrote accounts of their exploits 
during the savage but eye-catching early battles of 1950, none 
felt the tortuous passage of the truce talks worth recounting.11  
While Burchett therefore dominated the field partly by 
default, the publication of his Korean War experiences also came 
at precisely the right time. Again Korea hit the bookstores in 
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early 1968, in the midst of the Tet Offensive. Many war 
correspondents covering the searing Vietnam stalemate had already 
become convinced that U.S. officers had persistently tried to 
conceal the true facts of the war. When the communist Tet attack 
erupted in the midst of a concerted administration effort to 
demonstrate progress in the war, many journalists, commentators, 
and historians were predisposed to accept claims of U.S. 
mendacity.12 Indeed, with Burchett as a guide, the Vietnam 
credibility gap no longer appeared an aberration. It looked, 
rather, like part of a familiar pattern that extended back to 
America’s first major military engagement in the Cold War. 
 This was certainly the view of those writers who gave 
Burchett’s work wider circulation during the 1970s and 1980s. 
James Aronson led the way. In 1970 Aronson published a book 
entitled The Press and the Cold War, in which he repeated 
Burchett’s account almost verbatim, including tales of the U.S. 
military’s highly restrictive media policy; its mendacious claims 
in August 1951 about both sides’ position on the truce line; 
Burchett’s success in exposing these lies during the late summer; 
the military’s major clampdown in October; and its mounting 
frustration at the correspondents’ continuing fraternization with 
the more forthcoming enemy. After a few months of the talks, 
Aronson concluded, Burchett “became a regular source of 
information for their fact-starved and misinformed American and 
British colleagues.”13  
Five years later Phillip Knightley published The First 
Casualty, his magisterial history of war correspondents. In a 
best-selling book that has been repeatedly reissued, Knightley 
relied heavily on Aronson — and hence Burchett — to launch a full-
scale indictment of the U.S. military’s handling of the media 
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during 1951 and 1952. In the first phase of the war, Knightley 
declared, General Douglas MacArthur’s media relations had been bad 
enough, “but those adopted by his successor, General Matthew B. 
Ridgway, were disastrous.” With Ridgway, Joy, and the rest of the 
UNC’s negotiating team increasingly convinced that reporters had 
turned against the war, “censorship at the peace talks became 
total.” Correspondents were denied access to the officers actually 
attending the talks, were not allowed to consult any of the 
documentation used by the negotiators, and were fed “a mixture of 
lies, half-truths, and serious distortions.” Small wonder that 
many turned to those like Burchett on the communist side, for they 
“were a better source of news than the UN information officers.”14
Knightley’s book was crucial. Just as Burchett’s Again Korea 
has often been cited because it is the only war-correspondent 
memoir of the truce talks, so Knightley’s First Casualty remains 
enormously influential largely because it is one of the few books 
that explores the whole history of war correspondents. Easily 
accessible, it is still in print (in its third edition), and is 
widely used both by teachers and scholars of military-media 
relations. More to the point, its claims about the UNC’s Korean 
War activities continue to be repeated in a number of books, both 
scholarly and popular.15  
Because of Knightley’s amplification, then, Burchett’s 
highly critical interpretation of the military-media relationship 
at the Korean War truce talks still matters. But to what extent is 
this account accurate? It is not based on archival research. What 
does the documentary record tell us about the reliability of 
Burchett’s influential claims?  
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II. 
For a start, the assertion that Ridgway’s press relations were 
worse than MacArthur’s is clearly wide of the mark. During the 
first six months of the Korean War, when MacArthur was in command, 
the 200 or so correspondents who flocked to the cover the fighting 
were initially able to operate in a censor-free environment. 
MacArthur’s hope was that reporters would use this freedom 
responsibly, which, to him, meant basing stories on the UNC’s 
communiqués and briefings.16 But, especially during the major 
military reverses of July-August and November-December 1950, 
correspondents actually relayed home copy that was often based on 
graphic eyewitness accounts of battlefield disasters, equipment 
failures, and demoralized GIs. In December, in the aftermath of 
the military retreat sparked by China’s intervention in the war, 
MacArthur’s command retaliated with a vengeance, condemning 
reporters for embellishing the extent of the military debacle, as 
well as publishing stories that placed U.S. troops in severe 
jeopardy.17 And as relations between the two spiraled downwards, 
senior correspondents hit back hard, pointing to a growing 
credibility gap between Tokyo’s optimistic communiqués on the one 
hand and the reality they had witnessed on the other.18
It was not until MacArthur’s recall in April 1951 that this 
situation really started to improve. One important reason was 
Ridgway’s promotion to UN commander, for Ridgway was a media-savvy 
general who had always taken great pains to cultivate his public 
image. From his first days in Korea, he had introduced, at the 
Pentagon’s suggestion, an important innovation.19 As well as 
working closely with the military’s own information specialists, 
Ridgway had recruited his own personal media adviser—James T.  
Quirk, a man with hands-on experience working for a Philadelphia 
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newspaper—and had set him the task of making practical 
improvements to the daily round of briefings and communiqués: a 
reform that many reporters had enthusiastically welcomed.20 And 
when Quirk returned to the United States, Ridgway replaced him 
with Burrows Matthews, an editor at the Buffalo Courier-Express, 
who used his wide knowledge of all aspects of smaller newspaper 
publishing to improve the command’s relationship with 
correspondents.21
Throughout 1951, Ridgway and his senior officers went to 
great lengths to assess what had gone wrong the year before, as 
part of a concerted effort to improve their relations with the 
press. They started with field censorship. Although MacArthur had 
belatedly introduced a censorship regime in December 1950, its 
initial implementation had been so clumsy that that it had merely 
fuelled suspicions among war correspondents that the military was 
trying to cover up the extent of its mistakes.22 Once MacArthur 
was out of the way, censorship was streamlined and improved. In 
June 1951, Ridgway gave the task to a new UNC censorship office 
placed close to the front, which ultimately adopted a new set of 
rules. His officers also launched a concerted effort to shift the 
whole ethos away from suppression. They began by making briefings 
more effective, in large part because the advent of censorship 
meant that public information officers could divulge tactical 
information on a background basis without having to worry that it 
might turn up in tomorrow’s headlines. They then tried to ensure 
that communiqués and press releases were more accurate and more 
accessible, encouraging their subordinates to shy away from 
“cheap, publicity-seeking stunts,” and to focus instead on output 
that was “brief, concise, factual, and readily adaptable” to both 
radio and the print media.23
 11
In the field, one of the most pressing problems during the 
first months of the war had been the lack of trained public 
information officers who were fully briefed on the military’s 
preferred PR line and able to steer war correspondents in a 
particular direction. In fact, many of the stories that had so 
upset MacArthur during 1950 had been the product of reporters 
bypassing the public information network altogether and 
interviewing disillusioned, battle-scarred GIs who had just 
survived harrowing battles.24 During 1951, the UNC sought to 
address this problem, first, by undertaking a big recruitment 
drive, increasing public information personnel tenfold.25 With 
this influx of new men, the UNC public information office (PIO) 
also made greater efforts coordinate the military’s message at the 
front as well as the rear. Before public information officers left 
for Korea, they attended a revamped 14-week course, with more time 
set aside for the practical work of dealing with the media. Once 
they arrived in Korea, officers and enlisted men were invited to a 
series of conferences and seminars. Some were designed to acquaint 
all public information officers with “new problems, policies, and 
methods of coordination.” Others were aimed at improving 
cooperation between the different layers of the military machine. 
And still more were intended to acquaint new officers with members 
of the press, in the hope that they could build a constructive 
personal relationship from the start.26
Although some of these changes to field censorship had only 
a tangential impact on the UNC’s press relations at the armistice 
talks, they did help to change the basic atmospherics between 
officers and correspondents, which, though still haunted by the 
problems of the past, were at least no longer as gloomy.27 More to 
the point, Ridgway’s willingness to spark improvements—and 
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especially his determination to appoint men with extensive media 
experience to senior posts—would prove important once the talks 
began in early July 1951.  
To be sure, not all of Ridgway’s appointments at this time 
were well received. General Frank A. Allen, his new chief of 
information, was particularly disliked by most reporters, partly 
because he had stopped a series of major stories during World War 
II and partly because he had a well-known tendency for “spanking” 
journalists who disregarded his instructions.28 But the advent of 
Allen was somewhat compensated for by the selection of Colonel 
George P. Welch as the UNC’s new public information officer, for 
Welch was a steady old pro who had been responsible for public 
relations in various commands during World War II. In early July, 
after the UNC negotiating team established their base in the small 
town of Munsan-ni, Welch traveled to the new adjacent press camp 
with six officers and one enlisted man, in order to supervise all 
public information activities associated with the talks. He was 
thus on hand to deal with problems as they arose, giving a speed 
and suppleness to the military’s response to reporters’ complaints 
that had been altogether lacking a year before.29  
Even more important was the role played by General William 
P. Nuckols. Described by reporters as “the man in the middle,” 
Nuckols was yet another of the highly knowledgeable officers that 
Ridgway had placed in an important position.30 Before Korea, he 
had accumulated enormous experience working for a PR company in 
New York City during the 1930s, before rising to become the chief 
information officer for the Allied Expeditionary Force during 
World War II. Since 1950, he had been based in Korea as the chief 
public information officer for the Far East Air Forces, so he knew 
all about the potential pitfalls that awaited him at Kaesong. Each 
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day, his job was to travel to the talks with the UNC negotiators 
before returning to brief reporters. In Burchett’s account, 
Nuckols emerges as a rather sinister figure, who was consistently 
at the forefront of the military’s desire to suppress information. 
At the time, however, American correspondents saw him in a very 
different light. As the New York Times put it in a friendly 
profile, “Virtually the only reliable source of information about 
the ceasefire conference these days is a tall air force officer 
with a casual manner and a slight stammer ... [who] has managed 
quite skillfully as a mediator between the press and the 
delegates.”31
 Almost as soon as the talks started, Ridgway’s public-
relations team went to great lengths to make life easier for 
correspondents. On the opening day, most reporters were outraged 
that communist journalists had been present at the talks while 
they had been denied access to the negotiating site.32 Ridgway 
immediately promised to rectify this state of affairs. And when 
the communist negotiators initially balked at the proposed 
presence of western journalists, he even refused to let his 
negotiators return until this matter was resolved.33  
 Soon after, the UNC PIO provided improved billeting and 
communications facilities for reporters by establishing a press 
train, housed in the sidings near the UNC negotiators’ base camp. 
Whereas in 1950 correspondents had often “griped” about the severe 
lack of logistical support, now, as the command’s chief public 
information officer recorded, facilities at the new press camp, 
combined with the military’s “expeditious handling of news copy 
and photographs[,] resulted in [a] favorable reaction on the part 
of correspondents covering the armistice conference.” From time to 
time, senior officers would even tour the train and recommend 
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changes to make it more comfortable. Within weeks, censors were 
also placed on board so that they could check radio copy on the 
spot—an innovation that enabled radio reporters “to make their 
broadcasts closer to the source of the armistice talks.”34  
 
III. 
Still, even with all these efforts, the 100 or so correspondents 
who thronged to the new press camp in July 1951 were often 
discontent. During the first two weeks of the talks, when the 
negotiators haggled over the preliminary matter of what to include 
on the agenda, they were particularly upset by the lack of hard 
information that the UNC delegation made available. In one press 
briefing on 17 July, for example, public information officers were 
unable to answer even the most basic of questions, such as how 
many items were likely to be on the agenda, let alone what these 
were or what had proved to be the main sticking points. 
Thereafter, as the talks progressed on to vexed question of where 
to fix the truce line, the U.S. military initially persisted with 
its tight-lipped approach. Thus on 27 July, Nuckols merely 
informed correspondents that the UNC negotiators had taken maps 
into that day’s talks, which detailed the UNC’s demands. But he 
was not authorized to provide any details, other than the 
meaningless fact that “they were colored, one about 30 by 40 
inches and the other 50 by 36 inches.”35  
 Correspondents were clearly far from happy with the 
military’s reticence. With the truce talks dominating the 
political agenda back home, their editors frequently pressured 
them for substantial news stories, even scoops. On the opening day 
of the conference alone, correspondents filed 300,000 words of 
copy, while the daily average thereafter was around 180,000.36 
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Without informative briefings from UNC officers, the fact-starved 
reporters had to grope for ways to frame the issues. Perhaps 
inevitably, some even turned to broadcasts from the communist 
radio station in Pyongyang or comments by communist journalists at 
the talks, on the revealing grounds that they had frequently 
“given many more details on the conferences than pass through 
allied censorship.”37 This first happened on 1 August, when a 
number of correspondents repeated the claims by Pyongyang radio 
that the UNC was demanding an armistice well above the current 
battle line—and were unimpressed when military officials tried to 
dismiss these reports as “a lot of malarkey.”38
The same day, Burchett arrived at the talks, accompanied by 
Alan Winnington, a long-time member of the Communist Party, who 
had worked for the London Daily Worker since the early 1940s and 
had recently been denounced in the House of Commons as a traitor. 
The two men caused an immediate splash, as Western-based reporters 
crowded around them to ask questions about conditions in North 
Korea and China. In the coming months, Burchett and Winnington 
would also be viewed by many Western correspondents as a 
“barometer of communist thinking around the conference table,” for 
the simple reason that they were the only source for what was 
happening on the other side of the hill.39 Nonetheless, even with 
their own side providing little information, U.S. reporters were 
not ready to place much trust in these new arrivals. Thus, at the 
start of August, Time magazine asked pointedly if they would ever 
write stories critical of Red China. The Christian Science Monitor 
described their first efforts to influence the Western news agenda 
as “almost comic” propaganda.40  
Subsequently, Burchett turned this period into one of his 
main indictments of the UNC’s press policy, insisting that 
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Ridgway, Joy, and Nuckols perpetrated an “enormous” hoax on their 
correspondents by mischaracterizing the UN and communist 
bargaining positions. On close inspection, however, his 
allegations are incorrect on specific points. Crucially, they also 
ignore the major problems the military faced in trying to craft a 
public information policy during the hectic, complex, and fraught 
process of negotiating an armistice.  
In devising an information strategy for the talks, officials 
faced an awkward dilemma. On the one hand, they thought their 
bargaining strategy often required secrecy. At the heart of this 
strategy was the familiar American idea that the negotiators 
should open high, articulating maximum aspirations, which could 
then be modified and toned down as the talks proceeded, in a tit-
for-tat fashion, so that the ultimate outcome would closely 
approximate the government’s real goals.41 If such a process was 
carried out in the open, however, officials fretted that they 
would be denied sufficient flexibility. Indeed, American popular 
opinion might become so attached to the opening position that it 
would view any concessions from this as craven appeasement. More 
generally, America’s credibility and prestige in the world might 
be dented, if others countries saw it retreating from a stance it 
had carved out in public. Small wonder, then, that the Pentagon 
initially instructed Ridgway and his negotiators to refrain from 
giving too much information to reporters on a daily basis. 
“Arranging for an armistice during the progress of actual fighting 
is one of the most delicate negotiations in human affairs,” the 
Defense Department cabled on July 8, “and must necessarily be 
conducted in strictest secrecy.” “Ultimate success,” it 
emphasized, “must depend in some measure upon the willingness of 
the public to await concrete results and especially to refrain 
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from violent reaction to incomplete or unfounded reports and 
rumors.”42
 Yet such a tight-lipped strategy also contained clear 
hazards. As even public-relations’ neophytes recognized, whenever 
the officials cut the media out of the equation, correspondents 
were apt to speculate. As Allen, Ridgway’s media adviser, soon 
complained, in the absence of hard information correspondents were 
not compliantly mute; rather, they tended to “sit around feeling 
sorry for themselves and write stories that in many instances are 
pure ‘think pieces’ and have no bearing on the conference.” “The 
object lesson in this respect,” agreed Welch of the UNC PIO, “is 
that professional reporters at or near the scene of a major news 
event do not cease reporting simply because the flow of official 
information is turned off.”43  
 The military therefore recognized that it was treading a 
hazardous path. If public information officers said nothing, the 
press would speculate — or even fraternize with communist 
reporters. If they said too much, they might inflate public 
expectations and undermine their whole bargaining strategy. To 
make matters worse, the public information officers were 
traversing an unfamiliar path, navigating between unpalatable 
alternatives without a clear map to guide the way. It was hardly 
surprising that they made false turns, especially in the first 
phase of the talks, when they often erred on the side of caution, 
clamping down hard on the release of information. But they had the 
capacity to learn — to sketch a safer route the longer the journey 
continued — especially when they received heavy criticism from 
correspondents. As a result, they soon made important improvements 
to the flow of information, which belied some of Burchett’s 
specific claims. 
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 This learning process first occurred during August on the 
vexed question of the truce line. In the private bargaining 
sessions with the enemy, Joy opened with America’s maximum aims, 
convinced that the negotiating process would whittle these down to 
something closer to what the administration thought was an 
acceptable outcome: a division of Korea based not on the communist 
demand for the thirty-eighth parallel but on the more defensible 
current battle line. Joy dubbed his opening gambit the “basic 
concept.” The war, he insisted, consisted of three battle zones — 
ground, air, and naval. Because the UN enjoyed superiority in the 
air and naval spheres, he told the communist negotiators, it 
should be rewarded by additional territory on the ground, 
somewhere between the current battle line and the Yalu River.44
 At the start of August, the UNC public information officers 
were initially reluctant to reveal this “basic concept” to 
reporters. But they were not driven by an instinctive mendacity or 
a deep-seated distrust of reporters. They feared, rather, that the 
American public might become wedded to this opening position and 
demand an armistice well to the north of the current fighting 
front. If this happened, they would have much less freedom to 
haggle and the talks might well collapse. It was safer instead to 
provide vague briefings; but these were always opaque rather than 
misleading. Although short on details, they stressed that the UNC 
claim was for a truce line that “should maintain the approximate 
military balance of power existing at the time it was signed” — a 
carefully worded statement that contained the kernel of Joy’s 
“basic concept.” Moreover, contrary to the claims of Burchett-
inspired accounts, they did not distort the communist position by 
insisting that it was the enemy, and not the Americans, who 
refused to accept the thirty-eighth parallel. Far from it: 
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officials at all levels of the administration were keen to explain 
that the United States no longer considered the parallel a viable 
border, even for a temporary truce.45
During the middle of August, UNC public information officers 
then provided much more substance on this “basic concept.” They 
were, to be sure, thrust on to the defensive by a Radio Pyongyang 
broadcast that tried to expose Joy’s opening position. They also 
had to respond to an embarrassing press briefing by Ridgway’s 
Civil Information and Education Section in Tokyo, which appeared 
to confirm communist accusations by insisting that the UN “must 
reach agreement” on a demarcation line somewhere between the Yalu 
River and the current battlefield.46 But UNC negotiators still 
used the moment to launch their first intensive publicity effort. 
What the negotiating team really wanted, a series of communiqués 
declared, was not Korean real estate but “a defensible line.” In 
explaining exactly was this meant, Joy even “went into a detailed 
outline of the UN stand on the factor of allied air and naval 
power in the overall military situation in Korea.” As he explained 
to reporters, he had told the enemy that the UN was “prosecuting a 
war behind your front lines which is not duplicated behind our 
front lines. As soon as an armistice becomes effective you will 
acquire a degree of freedom of movement now denied to you. 
Recognizing your increased capability, the UN must, during the 
period of the armistice, insure that its ground positions are 
adequate to balance the advantages you gain by the withdrawal of 
air and naval power.” He was therefore pushing for a truce line 
further to the north, but the UN stance was not rigid. “We have 
repeatedly stated that we were willing to discuss the proposal 
jointly on a map,” Joy told reporters, “with a view to making such 
adjustments as would be acceptable to both sides.” The communist 
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claims that the UN was demanding a specific line from Kosong to 
Ongjin were false, agreed Ridgway in another public statement, 
since Washington had granted his command sufficient discretion to 
ensure that the talks would not bog down over any specific area.47
These statements were far more extensive and informative 
than the Burchett account suggests. And they were by no means the 
UNC’s last major effort to brief the press on its negotiating 
position. In late October agreement on the truce line seemed 
possible, after the communists agreed to give up their demand for 
the thirty-eighth parallel and accept the current battle line. The 
UNC, however, decided to introduce a new demand: Kaesong, which 
had important symbolic value as the old Korean capital and whose 
inclusion in the southern half of the country might appease 
Syngman Rhee, the South Korean leader, who was vehemently opposed 
to any deal that divided his country.48 In Burchett’s account, 
this was the moment when the UNC initiated a major clampdown; its 
public information officers, he suggests, were particularly 
reluctant to inform reporters about the new demand for Kaesong. On 
close inspection, however, this charge is far too simplistic. 
At first, in order to place pressure on the enemy and 
generate domestic support for the U.S. stance, Ridgway actually 
decided to launch a major propaganda offensive, issuing a string 
of press releases that played up “the characteristics of the 
proposed zone and the fairness of our solution.”49 Importantly, 
the military also believed the media was pleased with this new 
campaign. As Welch noted, the “allied press was grateful for the 
release of information on a timely basis.” Press reports certainly 
echoed Ridgway’s line, emphasizing that “the UN would not give up 
important parcels of territory won by blood and valor.”50  
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But this public position soon ran into an obvious problem: 
even with Ridgway’s PR campaign, officials in Washington were not 
convinced that the public, or the European allies, would be 
willing to prolong the war for the sake of Kaesong. In their 
opinion, it was far safer to compromise on the status of this 
city, so that the talks could move onto the next agenda items.51 
Ridgway and Joy, for their part, did not agree, and tried to 
persist with the Kaesong demand, although they ultimately had to 
give way to their Washington bosses. But while this policy debate 
was still raging, the UNC was faced with a tricky PR dilemma: it 
wanted, on the one hand, to keep up the pressure on the communists 
by stressing publicly the importance of not conceding territory; 
but it recognized, on the other, that this point might have to be 
conceded. Nuckols’ response was inevitably somewhat tortuous. In 
his press briefings, he stressed that the UNC negotiators were 
“strongly demanding” Kaesong, rather than “adamantly” pushing for 
it. But this “fine distinction” appeared a little too shifty for 
some correspondents, who turned to Burchett and Winnington for 
additional information, albeit with the caveat that these two men 
“often propagandize their allied opposite numbers.”52  
 
IV. 
Although the situation during the fall of 1951 was nowhere near as 
bad as the Burchett-inspired account suggests, even now relations 
in and around the press train were not always smooth. In October 
the UNC PIO released its first written warning to a reporter; two 
months later it issued the first “discreditation.” But these 
episodes should not be exaggerated. Indeed, neither indicated a 
major bout of military-media acrimony over a lack of truce talk 
information: the former was related to the breaking of a news 
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embargo on a visit to Korea by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff; and the latter involved a South Korean reporter who “had 
exchanged currencies of various types in excess of his needs.”53
 In fact, it was not until the winter of 1951-52, when the 
truce talks moved on to the emotive question of prisoners of war, 
that the major bout of military-media friction erupted. Whereas 
some correspondents had earlier turned to Burchett whenever the 
UNC was unable or unwilling to provide hard evidence, now the 
reporters’ main motive for listening to the other side was the 
familiar one of intense competition, which was particularly acute 
for the main wire services, whose whole professional existence 
depended upon getting to a story first. “Hell hath no fury,” a 
military public affairs adviser once quipped, “like a wire service 
scooped.”54 And in December 1951, when both sides at the talks 
agreed to reveal how many prisoners they held, the fury of wire-
service reporters prodded them towards all types of stratagems to 
beat their rivals to the punch. 
 According to U.S. military figures, 10,624 Americans were 
believed to be missing in action in Korea. When the communists 
agreed to hand over a list of soldiers they held in camps across 
North Korea and Manchuria, the media was “intensely interested” in 
obtaining the names of these survivors as quickly as possible. 
Ridgway even provided a special jet plane to rush the list to his 
Tokyo press room, but the Korean winter delayed its departure. 
With editors applying tremendous pressure on their correspondents 
“for the utmost speed in obtaining and transmitting the names” — 
and a lack of prompt information coming from official sources — 
Burchett had an obvious opportunity to act as a major source; and 
he seized the moment with alacrity.55 Indeed, he positively 
reveled in the sight of “most of [the] American press ... 
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virtually crawling on their hands and knees along the road to us, 
begging us for crumbs of information. We were in a lovely position 
of ignoring all those who had tried to injure us and handed 
priceless information to the few who had written honestly about 
the talks.”56
After the lists were exchanged, the talks soon stalled over 
these prisoners’ fate. With the communists admitting that they 
held 3,198 Americans, the correspondents turned their attention to 
the conditions in the communist camps. They were animated partly 
by a humanitarian concern for the fate of colleagues who had been 
captured in the early days of the war, especially after an 
unauthorized statement by Colonel James N. Hanley, chief of Eighth 
Army’s War Crimes Section, in mid-November that claimed the 
communists had murdered 5,790 POWs.57 But they were also driven by 
a desire to get a good story about big name prisoners like General 
William F. Dean. Once again, communist reporters like Burchett 
were their only obvious source. At the end of December Burchett 
exploited this opening, when he provided western reporters with 
details of an interview he had recently conducted with Dean, “over 
drinks of gin,” in which the general had recounted the story of 
his capture and Burchett had been able to ascertain that he was 
“in good health.”58 A few weeks later, Burchett then courted even 
more controversy when he helped an Associated Press reporter 
smuggle photographic and sound equipment into a communist camp 
that contained the Pulitzer Prizewinning photographer Frank 
Noel.59
In Tokyo, Ridgway’s and his senior public information 
officers were appalled by this last incident. Handing over such 
equipment, they believed, simply gave the communists a perfect 
propaganda opportunity to emphasize the good treatment the enemy 
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was according to American prisoners; and soon “carefully screened 
pictures” were duly returned “of smiling and well fed POWs.” 
According to Welch, the reporters’ deeds had now reached a point 
where “they constitute a threat to security and a travesty in 
honest reporting.” And Welch therefore concluded that “vigorous 
action” was “essential.” After much discussion, he ultimately 
released a new set of guidelines that would apply to all 
correspondents entering the conference site. From now on they were 
instructed to “conduct themselves in such a manner as to avoid any 
suggestion that military security is being placed in possible 
jeopardy or that traffic is being held with the enemy.”60  
Correspondents reacted to this missive with a spasm of fury. 
With the Red Scare raging at home, they were deeply troubled by 
the implication that they might in some be way security risks. To 
make matters worse, Welch’s memorandum suggested that much of the 
fraternizing had occurred while alcoholic beverages were being 
passed around. And reporters were highly alarmed by the 
connotation that, as one complained, members of the press pool had 
placed themselves in a position where they might, through loosened 
tongues, divulge sensitive information to the enemy. Indeed, it 
was this allegation that was particularly resented. “Never at 
Panmunjom,” replied Bill Barnard of the Associated Press, “did I 
ever see an allied newspaperman show the slightest effects of 
alcohol. But to listen to the army you’d get the idea that the 
truce village is a roistering rendezvous for correspondents.” Even 
if a flask was occasionally passed around as western reporters 
probed their communist counterparts, riposted George Barrett of 
the New York Times, this was “a necessary evil, made necessary 
partly because the UNC’s briefings have been inadequate.”61
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Amidst the intense ill-feeling generated by this specific 
incident, the first major spate of stories emerged complaining of 
the UNC’s media output and lauding the activities of Burchett and 
his comrades. Time magazine, scarcely a pro-communist organ, even 
ran a story in the middle of February that seemed to confirm 
Burchett’s broader interpretation. “Many UN newsmen disliked 
fraternizing with Red correspondents,” Time editorialized, “but 
feared they would be beaten on stories if they didn’t. They 
thought their job was to get the news, no matter how questionable 
the sources.”62
As this episode demonstrates, some of Burchett’s claims do 
indeed stand up against the documentary record. But they are 
select instances, invariably occurring when the communist 
correspondents had obvious sources of information unavailable to 
the UNC. The big controversy in February 1952 was a major case in 
point. At this particular moment, with heated charges flying 
around on both sides, a number of media figures were even kind 
about Burchett and scathing about their own side. But this was the 
nadir. For much of 1951 and 1952, the basic pattern of military-
media relations was far from “disastrous.” Before and after the 
POW issued flared, the UNC often went to great lengths to learn 
from its mistakes and institute practical improvements. And in the 
month after this controversy, the broader changes it was making in 
its field censorship operations now started to have an important, 
and positive, impact. 
 
V. 
When Welch, the steady old military hand, first heard about the 
attempt to smuggle cameras into communist POW camps he was 
determined to get tough. Indeed, he was so outraged that he 
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drafted a long and impassioned press release, which began with an 
indictment against the entire media delegation and ended with a 
list of proscribed actions and future sanctions. Crucially, 
however, Burrows Matthews, the experienced media man, swiftly 
intervened to shorten the document, ensuring that only “a few” 
correspondents were accused of wrongful behavior and toning down 
the charges to “excessive social consorting” and “unguarded 
conversations.” As already mentioned, even this indictment angered 
the press and resulted in a spate of stories challenging the 
military’s claim that “the truce village is a roistering 
rendezvous for correspondents.” But with Matthews exercising a 
careful eye over his more hotheaded colleague, the storm soon blew 
over. Within days, Welch even did his bit to improve the 
atmospherics, agreeing to provide the press with more factual 
background briefings on the complex matter of POWs.63
 For the most part, in fact, the POW issue was not a 
difficult sell, at least for officers based at Panmunjom, because 
the Truman administration was determined to squeeze as much 
propaganda advantage as possible from its stance at the talks. By 
the start of 1952, the focus of the U.S. debate shifted from the 
communist camps to the UNC compounds, for the simple reason that 
American policy was now wedded to the principle of voluntary 
repatriation: it would not force any prisoners to return to their 
homeland against their will. Although this principle contravened 
the Geneva Convention, officials recognized that voluntary 
repatriation was a superb propaganda tool. “This issue,” claimed 
one State Department official, “gets to the heart of the 
contention between communism and the tradition we live by. It 
bears on the rights of men to make choices and to claim 
protection.”64  
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In the spring, the UNC began screening prisoners to see who 
wanted to return home. But this soon became a messy process, 
largely because of the brutal conditions in the camps, with some 
compounds effectively controlled by communist prisoners, while 
others were ruled by nationalist “trusties” whose intimidation 
tactics prevented inmates from expressing their true preferences. 
As a result of this flawed screening, in early May the UNC 
negotiators informed their communist counterparts that only just 
over half of the 130,000 prisoners under UNC jurisdiction wanted 
to return home—a figure the communists immediately rejected as 
totally inadequate. With the talks about to collapse, the Truman 
administration launched a big public relations effort. Ignoring 
the messy reality, they focused on the human rights dimension. The 
reason so many communist POWs refused repatriation, UNC public 
information officers stressed, was simple: these people preferred 
the freedom of the West to the brutal communist dictatorships in 
the East.65
 On 7 May, however, this argument was exposed when communist 
prisoners on Koje-Do, the island housing the bulk of these 
communist prisoners, kidnapped General Francis T. Dodd, the camp’s 
commanding officer, and forced him to admit, among other things, 
that the inmates had not been able to make a free choice. 
Officials at all levels of the government immediately recognized 
that Koje was a major propaganda disaster. But in the narrow area 
of the military’s media relations, public information officers 
again showed an impressive capacity to make swift improvements.66  
At first, they had a tough job. In the wake of Dodd’s 
kidnap, many correspondents were convinced that they had been sold 
a bill of goods about conditions in the camps. Until now, the 
military had carefully controlled access to Koje-Do, and had used 
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this control to convince any interested reporters that the 
situation was under control, prisoners were generally content, and 
the screening process had been conducted efficiently.67 Now, none 
of these claims seemed terribly close to the truth. As Time 
pointed out, some compounds were so out of control that they had 
“successfully resisted all screening.” “Observers,” it continued, 
“were beginning to realize that the prisoner vote on repatriation, 
which at first seemed the only credible and politically valuable 
aspect of the whole affair, had not been arrived at by the UN in a 
true and careful polling but was in some cases a rough and ready 
guess.”68  
To make matters worse, Dodd’s release was initially handled 
very poorly. Press feelings were certainly not soothed by the 
imposition of tight censorship in the immediate aftermath of the 
incident, especially a ban on interviews with Dodd, when the 
haggard general arrived in Tokyo after his ordeal. As Colonel 
Roswell P. Rosengren of the Eighth Army’s PIO recorded, this 
restriction immediately “changed a friendly, tired press into a 
very angry press which picked up telephones and dug generals out 
of bed—unfortunately not those responsible for the decision.” Yet 
when the military then tried to compensate by releasing the terms 
negotiated for Dodd’s release—terms that included an admission 
that UN forces had killed and wounded many prisoners—
correspondents were still not happy. “To say the press was shocked 
at its release at all is the mild understatement of the week,” 
Rosengren wired the Pentagon. “It is the first time I have ever 
heard newsmen say, ‘The army suppresses a lot of stuff that 
shouldn’t be suppressed, but there are times for suppression—and 
this was the time!’”69
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Once again, however, the military learned from its mistakes, 
which was particularly important when the time came to regaining 
control of Koje, for this operation was bound to result in 
bloodshed. Before the attack was launched, the military maintained 
tight control over the flow of information, which was used to 
blame the enemy for all the carnage and killing. Indeed, UNC press 
releases detailed disturbing hauls of spears, gasoline grenades, 
knives, clubs, hatchets, and hammers, not to mention emaciated and 
beaten anti-communist prisoners who had been subjected to 
“kangaroo justice.” And journalists avidly followed these cues, 
reporting on the “full story of communist terrorism, torture, and 
murder of anti-Red prisoners,” paying special attention to the 
victims who had been “garroted, stabbed, burned, tied, and 
hanged.”70
 With the operational plans finalized for the recapture of 
the communist-dominated compounds, Rosengren then ensured that a 
group of correspondents would be able to cover this particular 
story easily and efficiently. On the day before the operation, he 
flew thirty-seven reporters to Koje-do, putting them up in Quonset 
huts, plying them with bacon, eggs, and toast, and even ensuring 
that they had time for a drink before the bar was subjected to the 
normal curfew. The next morning, these correspondents were driven 
to seats just 50 yards from the action, in which the army deployed 
tanks, flamethrowers, and tear gas to methodically break up the 
communist-dominated compounds and remove the inmates to “smaller, 
more workable units.”71 “Except for some delay occasioned by the 
heavy communication load,” Rosengren recorded afterwards, “the 
press was very pleased with the operation.” Indeed, the operation 
went so well that Rosengren was convinced he had discovered a 
deeper lesson. All this army assistance, he concluded, 
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“illustrated a sound general rule for army treatment of newsmen 
during a major news event: tell them what is going to happen, then 
let them watch it happen.”72 And back in Washington, the Pentagon 
fully agreed. The army’s chief information officer even thought 
the whole episode would make a good case study to teach the 
growing numbers of students enrolling in its improved public 
information courses.73
 
VI. 
On the other side of the hill, meanwhile, Burchett continued to 
rail against the Americans. It was solely their fault, he 
believed, that the armistice talks dragged on so long. “They never 
relinquished one objectionable point,” he declared, “until they 
had made sure they had raised another just as objectionable. And 
when the agreement was finally reached, they refuse to carry it 
out.” For Burchett, the only comforting thought was the fact that 
the aggressive Americans had been bloodied on the battlefield. 
“They may have been taught such a lesson,” he hoped, “as will 
force them to abandon for all times their plans for world 
domination by force of arms and turn to normal ways of making a 
living by producing and trading instead of by grab and plunder.”74    
Burchett’s jaundiced perspective naturally infused his 
writings thereafter, which always contained a polemical, 
propagandist edge. The surprising thing is that his interpretation 
of the UNC’s media relations has had such a lasting appeal. As 
this article demonstrates, the UNC made its fair share of 
mistakes. On occasion, it was infuriatingly unforthcoming. It was 
not above bouts of outright suppression. And its officers 
periodically lashed out at “disloyal reporters.” But for the most 
part, the UNC’s sins were those of omission rather than 
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commission. And even these omissions stemmed from clear 
constraints related to the difficulty of devising an information 
strategy in the new environment of complicated armistice talks; to 
some extent, they were also counterbalanced by the improvements 
Ridgway made to military public information during 1951. In short, 
then, the Burchett-inspired account is far too negative. The UNC’s 
public information record, compiled during the fraught and complex 
process of negotiating an end to a bloody and unpopular war, was 
much more positive than he, and his followers, have claimed. 
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